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VALUE-AT-RISK IN IT SERVICES CONTRACTS 
Robert J. Kauffman and Ryan Sougstad 
MIS Research Center, Carlson School of Management, University of Minnesota 
{rkauffman; rsougstad}@csom.umn.edu  
ABSTRACT. As information systems (IS) and technology 
solutions become increasingly service-driven, managers are 
faced with the task of choosing parameters such as service-
levels, pricing, and contract duration. Information technol-
ogy (IT) services vendors manage portfolios of contracts in 
which parameters, decided at inception, are often subject to 
future risks. The contract profit maximization decision may 
adversely affect the risk position of the firm’s portfolio of 
services contracts. We propose a model to inform vendors on 
setting optimal parameters for IS contracts subject to ac-
ceptable levels of risk. The analytic model presented draws 
from IS economics research and the principles of value-at-
risk (VaR) from financial economics. We provide examples 
which illustrate the trade-offs of profit maximizing contrac-
tual decisions to portfolio profit-at-risk (PaR). The contribu-
tion of this research is the application of VaR analysis to IS 
contractual decisions and the conceptualization of an eco-
nomic model of IS service contracts which embeds value-at-
risk constraints. 
Keywords: Contract evaluation, financial economics, IT 
services, managerial decision making, mechanism design, 
value-at-risk. 
____________________________________________ 
1. INTRODUCTION 
  Recent advances in open-standards architecture, in-
formation and communications technologies (ICTs), 
and the realization of large offshore talent pools have 
led to an increase in service-driven IT solutions [41]. 
New mechanisms such as grid computing, Web ser-
vices, application service providers (ASPs) and busi-
ness process outsourcing (BPO) allow firms to adopt 
flexible, service-driven solutions. Some pundits predict 
the end of the aforementioned traditional model of IT 
acquisition in favor of a purely service-driven technol-
ogy marketplace [19]. In addition, many technology 
vendors such as IBM (On-Demand), HP (Adaptive 
Enterprise) are now touting flexible, service-driven 
approaches to IT delivery. Service-driven IT strategies 
reduce the requirements for upfront investments for 
user firms and permit shared exposure of many tech-
nology risks with the vendors through contracts [38]. 
However, IT services contract structure poses 
unique challenges for service vendors. With the in-
creased flexibility offered by service-driven IT solu-
tions comes increased complexity and exposure to risk. 
IT services contracts typically cover a vast array of 
terms, such as service level, quality, timeliness, and 
penalties and incentives around these contractual pa-
rameters. Such contractual obligations, in fact, are con-
tingent liabilities to which the vendors are obligated. 
Underscoring many of these liabilities are risks involv-
ing technology costs, standards and skills. Established 
IT service vendors with multiple contracts across a 
diverse client base can be thought of as managers of 
financial portfolios, the value of which will be deter-
mined by the interaction of underlying risk factors 
among client contracts. Decisions regarding an indi-
vidual contract may impact the overall risk exposure of 
a client’s portfolio. For example, a manager may obli-
gate the firm to provide a specialized programming 
skill as part of a contract to which the firm already 
faces availability constraints.  While the manager may 
have made a profit or revenue- maximizing decision 
regarding the structure of the contract, the added con-
tingent liability may subject the firm to unacceptable 
risk to the profitability of its overall IT services con-
tract portfolio. We propose an analytic model to quan-
tify the fundamental tradeoff between IS contract ser-
vice levels, profitability and risk. 
Sourcing IT solutions in the form of services implies 
a new breed of risks for user firms, such as misappro-
priation of sensitive information and incentive align-
ments [21,32,43]. Indeed, such risks and approaches to 
risk mitigation have long been the subject of IS re-
search [4,20]. However, IT services also mitigate risks. 
Bhargrava and Sunderasan [17] model a pricing 
scheme for utility computing services. They show that 
the service vendor is an aggregator of user demand 
risk. User firms can increase capacity in their contract 
without the upfront investment required in a traditional 
IT solution strategy.  Thus, the vendor takes on the risk 
of the individual user firm’s demand uncertainty. 
Service-driven IT solutions allow for a great deal of 
managerial flexibility and risk sharing between IS us-
ers and their service vendors. However, this flexibility 
brings an increased number of decision criteria for both 
clients (user firms) and vendors. In a service-driven 
solution, the contract contains many parameters which 
parties must negotiate. These parameters will affect not 
only the value of the solution or contract at hand, but 
also will affect the value of the overall portfolio of 
contracts a firm holds. Contractual parameters such as 
service and security level, service sourcing, timing, 
incentives and penalties in aggregate, present a web of 
endogenous and exogenous risk factors. These contrac-
tual risk factors will either amplify the overall risk ex-
posure of a firm, or lessen it due to negative correla-
tions which allow for strategic hedging of IT services 
contracts. Managers are faced with a fundamental tra-
deoff: how to maximize the profitability of services 
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contracts while maintaining an acceptable level of risk 
exposure to the overall contract portfolio.  
New methods and quantitative tools are required to 
actively manage both individual contractual profitabil-
ity and overall portfolio value and risk tolerance. Thus, 
we ask the following fundamental research questions:  
(1) How should an IT services vendor optimally set 
contractual parameters given an acceptable level of 
firm-wide contract portfolio risk? (2) How can we 
achieve a better understanding of risk exposure in IT 
services contracts to inform managerial decision mak-
ing?  We develop our evaluative approach using value-
at-risk (VaR) concepts from financial economics, a 
theory base that offers unique potential for the study of 
IS management issues [6,21,44].
2. BACKGROUND LITERATURE
This research draws on three primary theoretical 
perspectives. The value-at-risk literature from financial 
economics informs managerial decision making with 
regards to risk tolerance. IS real option analysis in-
forms the modeling of IS risk factors and the value of 
managerial flexibility. Finally, the pricing of IT ser-
vices and information economics provides insights in 
the formulation of our model.  
2.1. Real Options 
Real options research in IS represents one of the first 
attempts to consider the value of managerial flexibility 
in the face of IS investment risks. Real options re-
search has its genesis in the field of finance with Black 
and Scholes’s [15] development of their option pricing 
model. An option gives the bearer the right, but not 
obligation to purchase (call) or sell (put) an asset at a 
specific price at a later date in time. Researchers, Dixit 
and Pindyck [26], recognized that a broad context of 
investment decisions can be conceptualized as real
options. For example, managers often invest in a pilot 
project which then enables them the option to invest in 
a full-scale rollout depending on how conditions, ini-
tially subject to uncertainty, materialize. Such options 
can be evaluated using financial economics methods. 
Researchers have extended real options thinking 
with applications of other theory from decision sci-
ences, economics and finance. Rob Kauffman (in [58]) 
has referred to this as the “third image” of real options 
research in IS.  Dai [25] and Zhu [60] incorporated 
game-theoretical approaches to real option analysis. 
This blend of economic optimization with options 
thinking, in our view, will be helpful to inform the 
modeling of optimal contract parameters for systems 
services. In addition, Fichman et al. [29] and Tallon et 
al. [58] stress the need to view real options as a strate-
gic management tool. In many respects, the analysis of 
optimal contractual parameters is an extension of op-
tion thinking in which managers become aware of the 
value of managerial flexibility and the risk-return 
trade-offs in contract portfolios. 
Recent trends in IS research on real options provide 
useful guidance for the contractual parameters, as well 
as the portfolio-level impacts. Kauffman and Li [42], 
for example, developed a model to identify the optimal 
timing of technology investments using real options. 
They model the uncertainties surrounding competing 
technologies which could be applied in a portfolio 
hedging analysis of contractual parameters involving 
competing technology standards. Bardhan et al. [8] 
model the effects of forgoing or delaying a project in 
an interrelated portfolio of IS investments. Bardhan et 
al. [7] further develop a model for optimizing time-
wise dependencies on IT investment portfolios.  
2.2. Value-at-Risk (VaR) 
Value-at-risk portfolio analysis techniques were 
pioneered by a team at JP Morgan in New York City. 
VaR has its roots in the aftermath of several major fi-
nancial calamities in the late 1980s and early 1990s, 
including the fall of Barings Bank of the Netherlands 
[45] and other international financial problems, and the 
Orange County, California treasury disaster [28,36,37].  
VaR provided management with a new means to better 
understand and control firm-wide risk exposure. A 
related approach called risk-adjusted return on capital
(RAROC) was under simultaneous development at 
Bankers Trust New York [23].  Many of the VaR con-
cepts come from the early derivative pricing work of 
Merton, Black and Scholes, and Cox et al. [15,24,52], 
the modern portfolio theory of Markowitz [51 and the 
capital asset pricing model and asset risk management 
ideas of Sharpe [55] and Lintner [47].  
Value-at-risk can be defined as a measurement of 
the worst expected loss over a given time horizon un-
der normal market conditions at a given confidence 
interval [36]. Initially, financial institutions used VaR 
analysis for passive information reporting to under-
stand their risk exposures. However, VaR techniques 
quickly grew towards defensive information reporting,
where firms began to implement standards and controls 
to avoid large-scale disasters. As a result, VaR is now 
used as an active risk management tool. Today, VaR 
theory and the associated methodologies for control-
ling risk in lending and credit, money market and de-
rivative instrument trading, and investment manage-
ment operations are advanced.  VaR methods are al-
most universally accepted as a basic part of a financial 
firm’s risk management tool kit, which is essential for 
the effective management of overall portfolio risks.  
Several researchers have examined optimal portfolio 
construction under VaR constraints. Liebowitz and 
Kogelman [46] and Lucas and Klaasen [48] were 
among the first to construct optimal portfolios subject 
to shortfall constraints in the form of minimum returns. 
Campbell et al. [18] develop a model to optimize port-
folio selection between stock and bond investments in 
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a VaR framework. Anderson et al. [3] produce a model 
of credit risk optimization under conditional value-at-
risk, which alleviates the issue of kurtosis by taking a 
mean value of expected losses. 1
2.3. IT Services Pricing 
Research in IT services pricing has its roots in auc-
tion economics. Westland [59] model IT services pric-
es based on congestion and network externalities. Gup-
ta et al. [31] develop a model for dynamic pricing of 
network access based on usage. Bhargrava and Sun-
daresan [16,17] present an optimization model for 
quality-contingent IT services and later develop a 
model to price grid computing solutions with demand 
uncertainty using an auction mechanism. Cheng and 
Kohler [22] further describe optimal pricing policies 
for Web-delivered applications using queuing theory.  
Sundararajan [57] examines fixed fee vs. usage-based 
pricing of information goods in situations of incom-
plete information. Huang and Sundararajan [34] model 
the adoption patterns of firms utilizing on-demand 
computing. 
One of the few works that incorporates VaR theory 
in an IT setting is Paleologo [53]. He introduces a me-
thod for pricing utility computing services called price-
at-risk. He argues that traditional cost-based pricing is 
not value-maximizing given the dynamics of utility 
computing services due to the reduced contract dura-
tion (vs. traditional outsourcing), low customer switch-
ing cost, high levels of demand uncertainty, high sunk 
costs, and the short product life cycle of a utility com-
puting infrastructure. He models these uncertainties 
with a confidence interval approach which has similari-
ties to a VaR model. He also uses a stochastic process 
for market adoption using a form of the Bass [10] 
model for technology adoption.   
3. MODEL DEVELOPMENT 
IT services encompass a broad range of application 
domains. Software development and business process 
outsourcing, IS security services, utility computing and 
Web-delivered application services are all areas in 
which pricing, service levels, and other parameters act 
as decision variables which will affect the overall prof-
itability of the services contract. Examples of optimiza-
tion parameters to consider are security and perform-
ance levels, contract timing (e.g., when to start, ability 
to abandon contract), amount a firm can sub-contract 
within the overall contact, and incentives and penalties. 
3.1. Model Specification 
One of the key characteristics of parameter selection 
1 The interested reader should examine the financial evalua-
tion literature involved with the pricing of real options for 
technology and other corporate projects [2, 11, 12, 13, 14, 27, 
39,49,53], portfolio risk and hedging methods [1,17,18], and 
additional VaR-specific methods [9,14,30,48].  See [55] for a 
more critical evaluation of the application of VaR methods.  
is that the decision affects the customer demand, or 
willingness-to-pay (WTP) for the service. Thus, the 
contract can be thought of as a complex product with 
differing dimensions of quality, with service levels 
acting as quality parameter. For the model in this pa-
per, we consider a base case in which a firm enters into 
an outsourcing contract for business process outsourc-
ing (BPO). The firm chooses to offer a certain service 
level mix. In this example, we consider dedicated or 
pooled BPO resources, such as an IT help desk.  We 
define pooled resources as either subcontracted, off-
shore or near-shore services, for example, a help desk 
call center owned by the vendor. The customer will 
prefer dedicated resources though; they will value the 
continuity and stability that dedicated resources pro-
vide.  Thus the client’s WTP is modeled as a function 
of the service level. The firm then selects a service 
level to maximize contract profits, subject to some 
level of value-at-risk. 
The value-at-risk constraint in the proposed model 
is an application of VaR thinking to the IT services 
contract parameters. We model the costs of providing 
IT services as a stochastic variable. Costs will have an 
expected future value, as well as a random volatility 
component. The costs can be modeled as a Gauss-
Weiner process, dc = µdt + ıdz.  That is, the future 
costs will have a mean value, µdt, along with a random 
component, ıdz, which may increase or diminish de-
pending on market conditions or other risk factors.   
To specify the value-at-risk constraint, we must con-
sider four factors or value-at-risk inputs.  See Table 1 
and Appendix A for definitions. 
Table 1. Value-at-Risk Inputs 
SYM-
BOL
VALUE-AT-RISK
INPUT
RISK
EQUIVALENT
M Mark-to-market posi-
tion
C, estimated parameter 
cost at t = 0 
ı Risk factor variability   Future cost volatility 
T Time horizon Time horizon 
Į Confidence interval Confidence interval 
Note: Mark-to-market position represents an initial valuation of 
the asset or project. ı is the standard deviation of asset returns or 
other project factors. Į is the confidence interval set by manage-
ment that a threshold, called the value-at-risk, will not increase 
beyond over the time horizon, T.
 A contract will affect the firm’s overall exposure to 
the cost parameters which the firms are liable to endure 
to provide services. We will examine not only the val-
ue-at-risk of an individual contract, but also the effect 
of a VaR position on the aggregate liability that the 
firm holds as a result of its portfolio of contracts.  
3.2. Value-at-Risk Analysis Approach 
We consider a monopoly IT services vendor that of-
fers two distinct levels of service: high (H) and low 
(L). The service levels represent dedicated on-site re-
sources vs. pooled offshore resources. We assume that 
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the service vendor negotiates with a firm that requires 
D fixed demand hours of service. We further assume 
that the service levels are substitutes from an efficiency 
standpoint, so that the service level does not affect the 
number of hours to complete the project. However, the 
high service level costs more for the vendor to provide 
and is more volatile because the vendor has less flexi-
bility in shifting and sharing resources. The high ser-
vice level is preferred by customers, reflected in the 
willingness-to-pay (WTP) function. Service level S is 
the percentage of the hours demanded which will be 
fulfilled with high service level costs, CH.  See Table 2 
for our modeling notation. 
Table 2. Definitions of Notation in the Model 
NOTATION DESCRIPTION            
S Firm profits 
V(S) Willingness-to-pay (WTP) 
TC(S, CH, CL) Total cost 
VaR(S, ıH, ıL,
ȡHL, t, Į)
Value-at-risk of cost inputs  
D Services contract hours, fixed demand  
S Service level mix (0 to 1) 
CH, CL High (low) service level, H (L) cost 
ıH , ıL Stddev high (low) service level H (L) cost 
ȡHL Correlation of H and L service costs 
ıP Portfolio value at risk 
Į; T Confidence interval; time horizon  
k Arbitrary constant for VaR constraint 
G Firm WTP for high service level (S = 1) 
The objective function is: 
     Max(S) ʌ = V(S)·D – TC(S, CH, CL)·D
         s.t. VaR(S, ıP, t, Į)  k 
               0 S  1     
The VaR constraint is a function of the exogenous 
cost volatilities, as well as the correlation of the high 
and low service level costs. 2 In an expanded version 
of the model, portfolio level risks are incorporated, 
such that the hours demanded in the contract and the 
decision variable S affect the existing portfolio.  For 
example a firm might have a portfolio of contractual 
liabilities of 60 hrs of CH and 30 hours of CL. An addi-
tional contract for 10 hours would affect the overall 
portfolio of contracts depending on service level S.
Thus, if S = .5, the total mix of the contract portfolio 
would be 65 hours of CH (+5 hours) and 35 hours of CL
(+5 hours), resulting in a portfolio service level S = 
.65.
Thus the general constraint to the objective function 
2
 The reader should note that we will use the term profit-at-
risk constraint (or PaR constraint) in the next section, as we 
develop the analytical model to examine business process 
outsourcing contracts in IT services optimization.  
in the portfolio context is: 
     VaR(S, ıP(ıH , ıL,, ȡHL,ȦH, ȦL), t, Z)  k
where ıP(ıH, ıL, ȡHL , ȦH, ȦL) = 
           ¥( ȦH2 ıH2+ȦL2 ıL2 + 2ȦH ȦL ıH ıL ȡHL).
In the illustrative example to follow we only consider 
the contract-level portfolio, where S = ȦH, and within-
contract risks.  
3.3. Simulation  
To illustrate the model at work, we present a simpli-
fied example with an assumed functional form for the 
WTP parameter of V(S) = G·S.½. This function states 
that as the mix of high level services nears one, the 
firm’s WTP for the services bundle approaches the 
standalone value of the onsite services. This function 
appears reasonable in that the customer firm will be 
willing to pay close to the full value, G, when S nears 
1. However, the client will pay much less for the ser-
vices as S approaches 0. Our intuition is that the cus-
tomer is asking for dedicated on-site services and the 
vendor wishes to negotiate flexibility to augment on-
site services with pooled shared services. The objective 
function becomes: 
         Max(S) ʌ = G·S.½·D – (S·CH +(1-S) ·CL) · D
s.t. VaR(S, ıP(ıH , ıL,, ȡHL,ȦH ȦL), t, Į)  k
In the unconstrained case, we can see that the first and 
second order necessary and sufficient conditions for 
maximization are as follows with respect to S: S* = 
(G/(2·(CH-CL))
2 , and d2ʌ/d2S = -1/4G·D·S-3/2, where G,
D, and S are strictly greater than 0.  The related input 
assumptions and model results are in Tables 3 and 4.  
Table 3. Initial Numerical Inputs for the Model 
INPUT DESCRIPTION            VALUE
D Services contract hours, fixed demand  100
CH Cost of high (H) service level   17 
CL Cost of low (L) service level     3 
ıH Std dev, high (H) service level costs     0.6 
ıL Std dev, low (L) service level costs     0.2 
ȡHL Correlation, H and L service level costs     0 
ȦH % of portfolio in High (H) service level .51
ȦL % of portfolio in Low (L) service level .49
Į Confidence interval 95%
T Time horizon   1 
G Firm WTP for high services (S = 1) 20
4. MODELING ANALYSIS AND RESULTS 
We first examine the base case of the single con-
tract. We then extend the simulation to incorporate 
portfolio effects. We consider the sensitivity of the 
results to timing elements and correlations. We also 
consider the managerial impact of contract investment 
and the option value of contract length. 
4.1. Base Case Analysis: A Single Contract 
Unconstrained Profit.  Table 4 illustrates our initial 
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simulation of optimal profits unconstrained by any 
profit-at-risk (PaR) lower limits.  We refer to profit-at-
risk as an instantiation of our value-at-risk construct 
for the purposes of this particular analysis setting.   
Table 4. Unconstrained Profit-at-Risk (PaR)  
MAX PAR NONE $0 $50 $100 $120 NONE
WTP ($) 14.28 12.92 12.16 11.00 9.98 15.49 
Service Lvl. 
Balance
  51%  42%  37%  30% 24%  60% 
Contract SD   32%  28%  26%  20% 21%
37%
Revenue ($) 1,428 1,292 1,216 1,100 997 1,549 
Expected
Cost  ($) 
1,014   884   818   723 648 1,140 
Max Cost Ĺ
(95%) ($) 
1,559 1,292 1,166 1,000 877 1,842 
Contract 
E(S($) 
  414   408   399   376 349   409 
Contract  
PaR ($) 
-130       0     50 100 120  -292 
Note:  Confidence interval for analysis: 95%.  PaR = profit-at-risk, an 
instantiation of the value-at-risk construct for the present analysis. $0, 
$50, $100, $120 denote different PaR levels, constraints in analysis. 
WTP=willingness-to-pay.  SD = std. dev. Service level balance stated 
with high service level costs as % of total costs. Costs, profits are in $.  
The second column in Table 4, None, illustrates our 
base case. In this scenario, the firm has expected un-
constrained optimal contract profits, E(S of $414, 
with an expected minimum expected contract profit-at-
risk (PaR) of -$130. The optimal service level balance
is S = 51% in high service level costs (and thus 49% in 
the low service level costs).  
Profit Constrained at 95% Confidence Interval.
If the firm wishes to be 95% certain (confidence inter-
val) that its IT services contract will not lose money 
(3rd column from left, 0), then the firm’s optimal ser-
vice level to rebalance to 42% high service level costs 
and 58% low service level costs. Note that in this case 
the expected profits are reduced by only $6, from $414 
to $408. Thus, for a relatively small reduction in prof-
its, a firm can reduce its risk exposure by $130.   
4.2. Trade-Off Analysis: Profit vs. Risk Reduction 
Profit-at-Risk Constrained at $100.  Moving right 
in Table 4 shows the trade-off between profitability 
and risk reduction. For example, a manager concerned 
with meeting a specific earnings target might require 
that the firm’s minimum profitability should be $100.  
Then, the column marked $100 is relevant.  Here we 
see that the loss in expected profits E(Sof $38  
(= $414-$376) is substantial in financial terms.  
Agency and Managerial Incentives. A new issue 
arises regarding agency, governance and managerial 
incentives. Note the far right hand column in Table 4 
now (also marked with None).  In this scenario, a man-
ager has set a service level of 60% (i.e., 60% high ser-
vice level costs and 40% low service level costs). This 
is not an optimal profit structure, even though the im-
pact to profits is marginal at $6 (= $414-$409). How-
ever, the risk exposure more than doubles—from -$130 
to -$292. What’s more troubling is that the overall rev-
enue of the contract is higher than the optimal contract 
at a 51% service level (again, $414 vs. $409). We 
should point out that many firms reward lower-level 
management on revenue targets, and do not consider 
the potential losses that may accrue at any confidence 
level whatsoever.  So, depending on how a firm’s in-
centives are aligned, a manager might want to “sell” 
this sub-optimal contract to the upper management—
an instance where the principal’s and agent’s incen-
tives for mechanism design are not in unison. This si-
mulation of value-at-risk indicates that the impacts to 
contractual decisions in IT services can go far beyond 
the analysis of pure profitability. 
Constraint: Profit-at-Risk > 0. Figure 1 shows the 
relationship between contract profitability and profit-
at-risk, and supports Table 4.  
Figure 1. Contract Profit vs. Profit-at-Risk (PaR) 
-$1,400
-$1,200
-$1,000
-$800
-$600
-$400
-$200
$0
$200
$400
$600
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9
Profit
Profit at Risk
Service Level Balance
Note: Figure 1 shows the simulated results of changes in the service 
level balance and the impact on both expected profit and profit-at 
risk using the inputs of Table 3. Profit-at-risk is the constraint, and it 
is set by management. For example, if management requires the 
minimum profits to be positive with 95% certainty, than the optimal 
profit point (S = .5) will fall outside the constraint boundary. 
Profit maximization occurs at the service level bal-
ance of S = .51 (x-axis).  The profit-at-risk curve acts 
as a constraint which is imposed by management. For 
example, if management requires the firm to have a 
positive expected profit with 95% confidence (PaR > 
0), then the optimal service level balance would violate 
the constraint. 
As illustrated in Table 4, if we constrain profit-at-
risk below $120, we shift the profit maximization point 
to the left. Under these parameters, profit maximization 
will then occur at the local maximum where the profit-
at-risk constraint holds with equality. However, if the 
profit maximization point occurs to the left of the apex 
of the profit at risk line, the constraint will not hold 
with equality. In such a scenario, the firm’s profit max-
imization decision will occur at a point at which the 
minimum expected profit at risk is higher than the con-
straint set by management—clearly not appropriate. 
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Such intuition can be useful, especially when consider-
ing such a contract in a portfolio of services contracts.  
4.3. Portfolio Impacts  
Adding a New Contract. We now consider the im-
pacts of adding the contract examined above to an ex-
isting portfolio of services contracts. See Table 5.  
Table 5. Portfolio Impacts 
HIGH-LOW SVC BALANCE S=.51 S=.42 S=.39
Contract E(S($)   414     408      403 
Contract PaR ($)   130       0      32 
Initial Portfolio
Portfolio E(S ($) 4,081  4,081  4,081 
Portfolio PaR ($)     -32    -32      -32 
Portfolio with New Contract
New Portfolio E(S($)  4,496  4,489  4,484 
New PaR ($)    -151      -32         0 
Note: This table shows the impacts of adding a contract to an 
initial portfolio of services contracts. The optimal profits occur 
when the service balance is .51, by lowering the service value 
and sacrificing profits, the firm can actually reduce the risk of its 
overall contract portfolio (S = .42).
Here the firm has aggregated its obligations for pro-
viding the skills in question to its existing contract 
portfolio of 1,000 total hours.  We examine the impact 
on the portfolio of adding another contract.  
The column where the balance between high and 
low service costs is 51% and 49% (S=51%), the uncon-
strained optimal, shows that the additional contract 
adds -$119 (=-$151-(-$32)) to the risk exposure of the 
firm’s new profit-at-risk of -$151. We can see if the 
firm has previously established a profit-at-risk con-
straint of $100, then it might prefer the high-low ser-
vice costs balance of S=42%, where the new contract 
adds no additional risk exposure. However, the initial 
portfolio implies that the risk exposure may be out-of-
balance and that the firm may wish to set expected 
profits to a non-negative dollar value. Thus, the man-
ager should chose the right-hand column, where S=
39%, to obtain useful guidance with risk management. 
Here again, the firm sacrifices profits of $9 from the 
optimal structure (= $414-$403), but has a 95% confi-
dence interval (or certainty), that the firm will not incur 
losses over the next year.  
Leveraging a Risk Cushion. Table 6 illustrates a 
different scenario. Here the portfolio is initialized un-
der conditions in which the profit-at-risk is relatively 
high. Thus, the manager may wish to consider the risk
cushion within the contract portfolio which might en-
able strategic decisions to be made. For example, con-
sider a customer who refuses to negotiate for IT ser-
vices terms with less than 51% of services at the dedi-
cated on-site high service level. As shown earlier, this 
structure, while profitable for the firm, implies signifi-
cant risk exposure, with a contract profit-at-risk of 
$195. However, the portfolio is able to absorb some 
slack. Profit-at-risk for the portfolio as a whole falls 
from $195 to $83, which is still strictly greater than 
zero.  Thus, if the customer firm is of strategic value, 
the IT services vendor may be willing to sign this con-
tract since the overall portfolio profit-at-risk is still 
positive.   
Table 6.  Portfolio Risk Absorption 
HIGH-LOW SVC BALANCE S = .51 
Contract E(S($)      414 
Contract PaR ($)     -130 
Initial Portfolio 
Portfolio E(S($)    4,081 
Portfolio PaR ($)       195 
Portfolio with New Contract 
New Portfolio E(S($)    4,463 
New PaR ($)         83 
5. OPPORTUNITIES AND ISSUES
The model that we have presented can aid several 
other dimensions of managerial decision making. Cor-
related risk factors and strategic portfolio hedging—
two especially interesting potential applications of VaR 
methods—can be encompassed in this analysis. Most 
technology risk factors will exhibit correlations by 
which an increase in one risk factor will likely be ac-
companied by an increase or decrease in another sepa-
rate risk factor. We consider three instances of related 
risk factors: negative correlation, positive correlation 
and weak or very low correlation.  
Negative Correlation of Risk Factors. A negative 
correlation of risk factors often occurs when two tech-
nologies are competing for standards adoption. For 
example, the recent competition between Bluetooth 
and Wi-Fi has led to negatively-correlated risk factors. 
Due to the need for standards in wireless technologies, 
success in one platform is likely to lead to the failure, 
from a market perspective, of the other technology. For 
IT services vendors, this negative correlation would 
likely affect the overall risk profile of their portfolio of 
contractual liabilities to support their customers. The 
cost of supporting a non-standard technology would be 
likely greater than the cost of supporting the “standards 
winner.” Thus the vendor could observe from the mar-
ketplace the relative likelihood of success of the two 
technologies. Rather than making an “all-or-nothing” 
choice of which standard to support, the vendor would 
attempt to hedge its position by taking on contracts 
supporting each standard. As the technologies evolve 
and the uncertainty around a standards war lessens, 
managers can take corrective action by taking on new 
contracts or opting out of existing contracts.   
Positive Correlation of Risk Factors.  Many of the 
risk factors in IT services are likely to have positive 
correlations with one another. For example, an increase 
in labor costs around a particular technology is likely 
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to be seen across labor markets, whether for offshore 
or dedicated resources. However, the impacts are not 
likely to be equivalent in both labor markets (which 
would imply perfect correlation). Even competing 
standards can exhibit forms of positive correlation. For 
example, the standards for digital music of Apple and 
Microsoft may in fact exhibit positive correlations, as 
the success in Apple’s format, driven by iPod sales, is 
also contributing to growth in Microsoft’s standards, 
given the latter’s shear dominance of the desktop plat-
form and recent capabilities in support of digital music 
and media. For vendors managing positive correlations 
in risk factors, it is important to identify how much the 
technologies are likely to co-vary due to changes in 
shared exogenous or endogenous risk factors.  
Low and Negligible Correlations for IT Services 
Risk Factors.  There are many IT services in which 
the risk factors will exhibit low or negligible correla-
tions. For example, IT security services and software 
development outsourcing are likely to involve different 
technologies and related skills. VaR analysis can help 
inform vendors as to the markets in which they may 
wish to expand. Adding additional uncorrelated prac-
tices or offerings will allow the vendor to lesson its 
overall risk position within its portfolio of contracts. 
One of the main obstacles to the correlation analysis 
is finding appropriate estimations or proxies for corre-
lations which could be used in the model. Technology 
diffusion models and simulations could aid in this en-
deavor, as we have seen in the research of Paleologo 
[53] of IBM. In addition, historical data on labor rates 
may provide estimates for correlations between par-
ticular skills. Managers should carefully scrutinize 
such estimations and conduct sensitivity analysis to 
evaluate the impact of deviation from any estimates.   
6. CONCLUSION 
The analytic modeling approach presented in this 
paper only scratches the surface in terms of potential 
applications and methods. One interesting factor is the 
idea of the confidence interval. Here it is presented at 
extreme tails or 95% confidence interval as used by 
financial services firms. However, a manager may be 
more interested in evaluating less extreme scenarios. 
For example, a 50% confidence interval would imply 
that there is a 50% chance that profits would dip below 
a certain level. That may be more informative for firm 
trying to manage revenue flows on a per project basis. 
On the other hand, a firm may be interested in the 95% 
confidence interval when evaluating the ongoing risk 
and return of the contract portfolio, regardless of any 
contract addition. Another interesting approach would 
be to derive an implied confidence level by which man-
agers would identify a profit-at-risk level, and then use 
a VaR analysis to calculate the probability that profit 
levels would dip below a certain level.  This is akin to 
the calculation of implied volatility in option pricing, 
where the analyst computes the variance of returns on 
the underlying asset consistent with a given asset price, 
risk-free rate of interest, strike price for the option, and 
time horizon to option expiration. 
Incorporating real option-based thinking will be a 
key modeling extension. We introduced an initial illus-
tration of how such thinking can structure contracts 
with value-at-risk constraints. Many parameters of 
contracts can be thought of as options, for instance 
penalties and buyout clauses in service level agree-
ments can be priced via real option analysis. These 
pricing decisions could in turn be considered in a VaR 
portfolio context. In addition, contractual liabilities 
may be conceptualized as corporate bonds, with the 
default boundary priced as the option to abandon the 
contract. An additional consideration involves the on-
going investment in the services portfolio. For in-
stance, a firm may make hiring decisions in order to 
mitigate the uncertainty surrounding skill constraints. 
In the broader context of outsourcing, parties may 
structure contracts such that vendor receives a base 
payment to maintain an ongoing IS service with the 
expectation that the vendor will keep up with technol-
ogy advancements. So the vendor must make decisions 
regarding the optimal size and timing of investments 
with regard to its portfolio of service obligations. 
Several obstacles exist to implementing the kind of 
VaR analysis that we have described.  Preeminent 
among them is the estimation of the volatility of cost 
factors. Labor markets could provide proxies for wage 
volatility. In addition, modeling techniques and simula-
tions could be used to model technology risk (e.g., 
adoption, cost deflation, Moore’s law). Correlation is 
also a difficult input parameter to estimate. Sensitivity 
analysis should always be performed when estimates 
of volatility are used. Simulation techniques may also 
prove useful. For example, for contracts around tech-
nology standards, correlation may be modeled by 
simulating competing technologies’ market diffusion. 
In addition, the use of conditional value-at-risk [3] 
may reduce the impact of kurtosis and non-normal 
distributions, which are likely to occur when modeling 
technology risks. We expect that as firms implement 
this methodology, they will build competencies in es-
timating volatility and other input parameters.  
From an analytic modeling standpoint, a full closed 
form solution to the robust model outlined in this paper 
will provide insights that stand on their own (i.e. iden-
tification of conditions in which higher or lower ser-
vice levels should be chosen). Joint optimization con-
sidering simultaneous risk minimization and revenue 
maximization could be considered. However, from a 
decision support standpoint, the analysis must be aug-
mented by sensitivity analysis to understand the vul-
nerability to input estimations. In addition, further 
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work is needed to estimate the demand functions for 
various IT services and understand the sensitivity that 
occurs as a result of any assumed functional form. 
This work provides a contribution to IS literature in 
two ways. First, it represents one of the first robust 
applications of VaR methods and qualitative risk and 
reward trade-offs. Second, it incorporates VaR analysis 
in an optimization model of IS service parameters 
which provides useful managerial decision support. We 
illustrate several scenarios where a profit-maximizing 
decision is not optimal relative to managements’ toler-
ance of risk. In addition, we model the impact of con-
tract duration and structure to risk exposure and pro-
vide scenarios where managers can structure the timing 
of contracts to mitigate risk. This new realm of ser-
vices sciences [33,35] represents a new frontier for IS 
researchers. With IS solutions increasingly service-
driven, IS researchers can provide unique insights into 
a new realm, where the technology, business processes 
and services can all be brought together.  
Recent work in automated IT services management 
and “sense and respond” mechanisms [40] could pro-
vide sources of data to our model; thus enabling the 
analysis of intricate risks associated with business 
process outsourcing and service-level monitoring. 
From a managerial standpoint, this work offers the 
promise of new techniques to match contractual pa-
rameters based on an overall risk portfolio. Just as fi-
nancial institutions realize profits by matching interest 
rates offered to a thorough understanding of risk expo-
sure, so can IT services vendors realize competitive 
advantage by strategically matching contractual risk 
exposure to their services offerings. Customers of IT 
services will also benefit as providers will be more 
willing to absorb new client risks in IT services offer-
ings. Future research may also explore a dual formula-
tion of our “primal model.” The dual might be a useful 
means to examine how to optimize a large customer’s 
IT services contract management.   We expect that the 
methods that we have described can also be applied in 
other IS settings, for example, risk assessment in the 
bundling of information goods [5], evaluation of in-
formation security services, and other information 
practices in the firm.  
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Appendix. Value-at-Risk Analysis Terminology 
COMPONENT DEFINITION
Value-at-risk The worst expected loss which an in-
vestment will incur over a discrete time 
period at a specified confidence interval.  
Mark-to-market
position
The value of an asset or a portfolio based 
on current market value. In the case of 
systems and technology investments, this 
will be the current project value or the 
current expected cost of a project input.   
Variance of 
asset value or 
returns
Measures the variability of a risk factor 
that underlies asset value, usually stated 
as a variance or a standard deviation.  
Time horizon Time frame over which value-at-risk is 
to be assessed, based on managerial dis-
cretion relative to the risk perspective. 
The time horizon is typically chosen 
based on the asset’s liquidity. For exam-
ple, inter-bank loan analysis is typically 
done with daily increments, whereas a 
mutual fund may use a 30 or 90-day time 
horizon.
Confidence
interval 
The probability bounds on the observa-
tion of a specified value-at-risk outcome, 
chosen based on a firm’s desire to man-
age payoff and return outcomes up to a 
predetermined likelihood. 
Correlation of 
asset value or 
returns
Measures the extent to which asset re-
turns co-vary with one another. The val-
ues could range from -1 (perfect negative 
correlation), to 0 (no correlation), to +1 
(perfect correlations). This input is used 
when looking at portfolio-level value-at-
risk.
Note: The material here is adapted from Crouhy et al. [23] 
and Jorion [36].
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